Strīdi/diskusijas

Vai partijas jāfinansē no valsts budžeta?

Skat. starptautiskos standartus

Argumenti par:

Atziņas no Venēcijas komisijas 2001.gada partiju finansēšanas vadlīnijām pievienotā ziņojuma:

Here too the choice raises an essential substantive issue. As mentioned above, for decades many countries had no legislation governing the financing of political parties, which implies that the state took no interest in such matters, leaving each party entirely free to raise the funds necessary to its functioning here and there, without being too scrupulous about the methods employed.
This completely anarchical state of affairs led to the excesses of which we are aware. Each party had to raise funds at all costs, and the richest were the strongest. Since there were no rules, and therefore no limits on either income or expenditure, parties competed with one another in a frantic race to find contributors, and the firms contacted took advantage of the position of strength in which they then found themselves in order to provide funds - with strings attached - to those parties that would get their message across and safeguard their interests.
Hence the - when all's said and done quite recent - idea of ending this constant quest for financing by providing a public source of funds, with the aim of placing parties and their candidates on a more equal footing.

Atziņas no IFES 2009.gada ziņojuma par globālo pieredzi partiju finanšu regulēšanā 59.-60. lpp.

These and other discussions on public funding allow us to identify the following potential goals of public funding systems (in no particular order);
Increase capacity of political parties and candidates to reach the electorate and thereby allow voters to make more informed choices (shorter term);
Level the playing field between political parties and candidates with different level of resources (in elections); Increase institutionalization of political parties (longer term);
Reduce political corruption (mainly dependence of politicians on influential donors); Reduce the role of money in politics (whether corrupt or otherwise); Using public funding to influence the behavior of political parties (regarding financial transparency, gender equality, minorities etc)

Argumenti pret:

Atziņas no IFES 2009.gada ziņojuma par globālo pieredzi partiju finanšu regulēšanā 74.-76. lpp.

From table 14, it can be stated that these are some of the most commonly cited potential problems with public funding of political parties and/or candidates:
Delinking/etatization (political parties lose their connection to the people)
Petrification/ossification (the party system fails to adjust to new trends in support)
Domination (government parties can use public funding to solidify their position)
Unpopularity (public funding of political parties and campaigns is simply unpopular)

Magnusa Omana atbildes argumenti atrodami IFES 2009.gada ziņojumā par globālo pieredzi partiju finanšu regulēšanā 74.-76. lpp.

Vai vajadzīgi partiju tēriņu griesti?

Skat. starptautiskos standartus

Argumenti par:

Atziņas no IFES 2009.gada ziņojuma par globālo pieredzi partiju finanšu regulēšanā 46.lpp.

In many modern democracies limits on party and campaign expenditures are used to avoid excessive increases in the cost of party politics, control inequalities between parties and restrict the scope of improper influence and corruption. Allan Ware, a professor of politics at Oxford University, suggests that, “One means of attempting to stop a ‘feeding frenzy’ among parties in their search for funds is to restrict how much they spend on a very costly activity—namely election campaigning.”3 There are few other arguments in favor of spending limits. Firstly, unrestricted spending can give an unfair advantage to those with access to money and may make politicians dependent on large contributors. Secondly, spending limits are also a means to prevent candidates or parties from indirectly buying votes (by, for example, inviting potential voters to expensive events with free music, gifts, food and drinks). Thirdly, spending limits can prevent the political debate at election times from being distorted by having the discussion shifted away from matters of general concern to center on issues which have substantial financial support.

Argumenti pret:

Atziņas no IFES 2009.gada ziņojuma par globālo pieredzi partiju finanšu regulēšanā 47.lpp.

Limits on campaign expenditure should by no means be perceived as an ideal legal mechanism that states should utilize in attempting to reduce the cost of politics. Spending limits can contribute to a conflict between two fundamental principles of modern liberal democracy – the need to secure political equality and the need to secure political liberty. The problem arose in two interesting cases. Firstly, in the United States in the Buckley v. Valeo case when the Supreme Court held the three main spending limits provisions to be unconstitutional. These included a limit on independent expenditures, a restriction on the amount of private resources which the candidate could use, and a total spending limit on candidates running for federal office.9 In the landmark Buckley v. Valeo decision, the U.S. Supreme Court, influenced by First Amendment and freedom of speech considerations, undermined comprehensive legislation passed in the aftermath of Watergate. Secondly, in Bowman v. U.K., the Court found that a very strict restriction on spending related to an election by a private person was an unreasonable infringement of freedom of expression. The Court found the section 75 of the 1983 Act, for all practical purposes, as a total barrier to Mrs. Bowman’s publishing information. The Court questioned if it was necessary to limit her expenditure to GBP 5 in order to achieve the legitimate aim of securing equality between candidates. It concluded that the restriction in question was disproportionate to the aim pursued. The European Court reminded that free elections and freedom of expression, particularly freedom of political debate, together form the bedrock of any democratic system.

Furthermore, in some countries the artificially low legal limits on permitted campaign spending make the reporting of political party expenditure irrelevant, as happens in India and Israel. In addition, research conducted by the author has pointed out that spending limits make disclosure provisions harder to enforce. Polish as well as the Russian10 and Ukrainian examples (see table 1) show that spending limits have proved in practice to be irrelevant, having been introduced at unrealistically low levels. Not only have they failed to curb the political finance “arms race”, but their failure has also under¬mined confidence in the entire system of political finance regulation. These rules have also made it difficult to assess true levels of expenditure. Since no party desires to be sanctioned for breaking laws on spending limits, they will often report spending below the limit. Moreover if opposing political parties all flout the laws concerning spending limits and disclosure, “non-aggression pacts” can occur. As a result voters, CSOs, and media can’t receive credible information necessary to monitor campaign finance.

There are a few additional challenges to spending limits which are worth discussing. Most importantly, they are particularly difficult to regulate and to enforce. The introduction of spending limits can lead to a number of important policy decisions such as time-period during which spending limits apply, items of spending to be counted as “campaign” costs, and organizations to be included within the spending limits. According to Herbert E. Alexander: [E]xpenditure limits are illusory in a pluralistic system with numerous openings for disbursements … [W]hen freedom of speech and association are guaranteed, restricting money at any given point in the campaign process results in new channels being carved through which monied individuals and groups can bring their influence to bear on campaigns and officeholders.11 For example, if a spending limit is defined as “campaign spending” only (applying to a set period of time before an election), it will be possible for a party to print campaign literature, put the billboards up, present its’ broadcasts, and send direct mail in advance of the set period. An important factor must be taken into consideration where the application of limits in transition countries is concerned—inflation or, as has been the experience of some of these countries, hyperinflation.12 All things considered, some experts argue that the ‘ban on paid political advertising on TV is arguably far more effective than formal limits on parties’ spending in limiting the costs of electioneering.’

Marčina Valecka pretargumenti (mītu atspēkojums) atrodami šeit: 51.lpp.

Interesanta analīze par to, vai tas, kurš vairāk tērē, vienmēr uzvar, atrodama 2009.gada decembra IDEA pārskata 8.-9.lpp.

Vai jāregulē tā saucamo "trešo personu" kampaņas?

Skat. starptautiskos standartus

Argumenti par:

Atziņas no IFES 2009.gada ziņojuma par globālo pieredzi partiju finanšu regulēšanā 47.lpp.

One should also stress that once the political finance system imposes caps on the spending of candidates and parties to limit an unfair advantage, there must be limits on others (so called “third parties”). Otherwise wealthy supporters or action groups could spend money directly for the benefit of one candidate or in order to prevent the election of another. If spending limits apply only to a candidate/party only attacks against a candidate might go unanswered on account of the limit on the amount of money a candidate is allowed to spend. In order to be effective, spending limits will need to apply to interest groups as well. In Britain, for example, the new electoral spending cap on party organizations of some USD 30 million (GBP 20 million) each is accompanied by a cap on pressure groups of USD 1.5 million (GBP 1 million) each. Even this will not solve the problem of evasion. If there is a limit on a trade union of USD 1.5 million, what is to stop that union from creating several sub-units, each of them formally independent and each entitled to spend USD 1.5 million. The ability to proliferate "independent" committees and pressure groups undermines the prospects of effective spending caps. Some experts argue that the restrictions on third-party expenditure can help to ensure that candidates remain independent of the influence of powerful interest groups.

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